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Abstract 
 
Amid lively debate on the consequences of temporary employment, the paper examines the 
wages and transitions of temporary employees in Germany using socio-economic panel data 
from the late 1990s. Compared to simple OLS estimates, using a fixed effects model 
decreases wage differentials between permanent and temporary workers. A two-step 
instrumental variables estimator leads to insignificant estimates, suggesting that the contract 
type is an endogenous variable. Moreover, about 1/5 of male temporary employees experience 
significantly higher 2 and 10 year wage growth than workers on permanent contracts. Using 
multinomial logistic regression models we find that many temporary workers move into 
permanent jobs, often with the same employer. For some temporary employment leads to 
unemployment, particularly those with low human capital. Positioning ourselves between 
arguments on the positive and negative consequences of temporary employment, we develop 
the idea of a two-tier labour market for temporary employment in Germany. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Making Germany's labour market more flexible has been on the agenda for some years now. 
That Germany is far from having already reached a satisfying state in the labour market is 
well known. However, as it seems that the current recession has hit Germany more than its 
European neighbours, the topic has become of primary interest once again. Politicians outstrip 
each other with suggestions to increase employment and liberalize the labour market. Against 
that background it is surprising that empirical research on existing flexible instruments in the 
labour market is relatively scarce. One such instrument – fixed-term contracts – is looked at in 
more depth in this paper. These contracts are often also called temporary contracts, although 
temporary work can additionally include agency or casual and seasonal work. We focus on  
those contracts that are by definition not open-ended but fixed to a maximum duration from 
the start.  
 
The German example is especially interesting, as it seems to be an intermediate case between 
countries with high employment protection and high percentages of fixed-term jobs like 
Spain, France and Italy and countries with low employment protection and low fixed-term 
employment like the UK or the US. In fact we know that Germany has relatively high 
employment protection but fixed-term contracts did not increase significantly in the 1990s 
although their use has been made easier by legislation introduced in the 1980s (Rudolph 2000, 
Bielenski 1997).   
 
Yet some of the most animated discussion of temporary employment is about the 
consequences of temporary employment for individual employees, and this is the focus of this 
paper. Different approaches to the labour market offer different perspectives on temporary 
employment. Buechtemann and Quack (1989) were some of the first to use the question “a 
bridge or a trap?” to juxtapose these different perspectives. For some approaches, temporary 
employment is seen as a very disadvantageous labour market situation, with low wages, bad 
conditions of employment and poor prospects, a “trap”. In favour of this hypothesis is 
evidence from a number of European countries showing that workers on a fixed-term contract 
tend to earn less than comparable co-workers (Schömann and Hilbert 1998). For others, 
temporary employment is seen as a stepping stone to permanent employment, often 
facilitating the transition into working life from outside the labour market, a “bridge”.  
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Indeed many researchers and policy-makers argue that what happens after a temporary 
contract is more salient than the current conditions associated with the job (e.g. wages, fringe 
benefits etc). Remember that this situation is, by its very nature, a temporary one. The fact 
that many temporary contracts in Germany are legally limited to 2 years makes a compelling 
case for examining what happens after such a contract. To answer these questions we need to 
know something about workers longer run wage paths in Germany as well as transitions 
between fixed-term contracts and other labour market states – more  than is already known in 
the literature.   
  
We address the following key questions in our paper: Recasting the question of wage 
differences we ask to what extent are wage differences a result of unobserved differences 
between temporary and permanent workers? Is the contract type an endogenous variable? Are 
workers really stuck in those jobs over a longer time horizon? What happens to the wages of 
those workers who stay in the labour market over a five or ten year period? Which temporary 
workers are more likely to stay employed and get a permanent job? Are there any differences 
between East and West Germany in this regard?  
 
This paper gives some intriguing new insights into wage differentials and wage dynamics, 
transition behaviour of fixed-term contract workers using the German Socio-economic Panel 
for East and West Germans (Soep Group 2001). We  begin in section 2 by giving a review of 
the literature, discussing the possible reasons why firms might use fixed-term contracts and 
how this type of contract will influence wages and transitions. This is followed by a short 
description of our data and an overview of who can be found in a fixed-term contract (section 
3). Section 4 then challenges the view that fixed-term contract workers always earn less by 
comparing pooled OLS wage regression estimates with the outcome from fixed-effects (or 
random effects) regressions. We also present a two-step Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimator, because including a fixed-term dummy may cause endogeneity problems and bias 
our estimates. In section five we deal with dynamic issues. Wage growth regressions are 
reported in section 5.1 for year to year, five year or ten year intervals. Section 5.2 goes on to 
look at the transitions between fixed-term employment, permanent employment 
unemployment and non-participation.  
 
This paper is innovative in a number of ways. Firstly, while other authors have compared 
wages of fixed-term and permanent employees in Germany (e.g. Schömann and Kruppe, 
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1993, 1994; Hagen, 2001), we present the first wage regressions focusing on temporary 
employment in Germany which use the panel element of the data to control for unobserved 
differences between individuals. Secondly, while Booth et al. (2002) analyse some wage 
trajectories in 1990s Britain, this is the first paper which compares wage growth among 
temporary and permanent employees in the short and longer term in Germany. Thirdly, while 
previous work has considered the role of fixed-term contracts in labour market transitions (see 
especially Giesecke and Gross, 2002; Dekker, 2001), this is the first analysis which follows a 
group of employees on fixed-term contracts and considers their labour market status 1 and 4 
years later.  
 
2. The use of fixed-term contracts and theoretical consequences for wages and 
transitions 
2.1. Why firms use fixed-term contracts 
 
Dismissal regulations in Europe and high firing costs of permanent workers are generally 
believed to be the primary reason for the use of fixed-term contracts (see OECD 1993). In 
Germany, like in other European countries, there are legal rules and decisions of labour courts 
which make it expensive and time-consuming to lay off workers. Since the "Employment 
Promotion Act" of 1985 employment protection has been reduced by allowing the creation of 
fixed-term jobs without a reason (see Appendix A for details). The central idea of this act was 
to reduce unemployment by facilitating the use of temporary contracts. However, Blanchard 
and Landier (2002) argue that the introduction of fixed-term contracts may have perverse 
effects: the main effect could simply be high turnover in fixed-term jobs, leading to higher 
and not lower unemployment.  
 
Obviously the relative costs of hiring and firing as well as expectations about long-run sales 
opportunities influence firms decisions. Quite a large body of literature discusses the 
theoretical links between labour demand and adjustment costs (see e.g. Nickell 1978 and for 
an overview Hamermesh and Pfann 1996). Empirically Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) 
analyse the macroeconomic implications of fixed-term contracts and estimate that this type of 
employment significantly increased overall employment in Spain (see Dolado et al. 2002 for 
an overview of the Spanish experience). In a model with asymmetric adjustment costs Goux 
et al. (2001) show for France that indeed it is much more costly to lay off permanent workers 
than to hire them and much less costly to adjust the number of fixed-term contracts. The 
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asymmetry seems to be more important for non-production workers. However, we see large 
international differences, that are in need of some explanation: though legislation on the use 
of fixed-term contracts in Germany has been relaxed since the mid 1980s, Germany has 
significantly lower rates of fixed-term contracts (6.3%) than France (11.8%) or Spain (31.6%) 
(Rudolph 2000). This difference is sometimes underestimated in comparative studies as 
apprenticeship trainees are often included in German figures. When apprentices are included, 
the percentages are 12.2% for Germany, 13.9% in France and 32.9% in Spain. Perhaps the 
lower rate of temporary jobs indicates that asymmetries between contract types tend to be 
lower in Germany. Or alternatively, apprenticeships are used as a low-wage substitute for 
other fixed-term contracts.  
 
Moreover, German firms tend to react to changes in labour demand by adjusting average 
hours rather than employment levels (Houseman and Abraham 1993). This is facilitated by 
subsidized short-time work and relatively moderate overtime premiums of roughly 20%.  
Confirming this view Hunt (2000) shows that facilitating the use of fixed-term contracts in 
1985  did not affect employment adjustment in Germany. However, when unions in certain 
industries allowed hours per worker to fluctuate without associated overtime payment there 
was a small reduction in the speed of adjustment of workers. Hunt concludes: "The results 
imply either that firing costs are less important than commonly thought, or that the short-term 
contracts did not reduce them sufficiently" (p. 178).  
  
On the other hand, Boockmann and Hagen (2001) show that fixed-term contracts also serve as 
a means of employment adjustment: positive changes in expected or actual turnover are 
associated with higher probability of fixed-term contracts in Germany (see Holmlund and 
Storrie 2002 for the Swedish experience). Moreover, they show that reducing dismissal 
protection in 1996 significantly reduced the use of fixed-term contracts in those firms that 
were exempted from dismissal regulations (the threshold level was raised from 6 to 11 
employees). Moreover, they report that the existence of works councils significantly increases 
the use of fixed-term contracts as works councils tend to increase the costs of laying off 
permanent workers. So far we can sum up that fixed-term contracts in Germany, though used 
as a measure of adjustment, are not the most important means.  
 
This seems surprising as similar reforms in Spain in the mid 1980s led to sharply different 
outcomes. As already mentioned above fixed-term contracts in Spain now make up around 
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30% of all contracts. The OECD Employment Outlook  (1993) mentions three possible 
reasons for this phenomenon: (i) strong sense of social partnership in Germany with firms 
regarding long-term relationships as an asset (Büchtemann 1993), (ii) wide availability of 
fixed-term apprenticeship contracts that pay well below entry-level wages (Rogowski and 
Schömann 1996) or (iii) firing cost differentials between different contract types remained 
higher in Spain than in Germany at least in the 1980s.  
 
Another hypothesis sometimes proposed for the use of fixed-term contracts is the screening 
hypothesis. For example, employers have problems predicting the productivity of potential 
employees, so they use temporary employment as a screening contract. This is particularly 
relevant for younger workers with less work experience, but also perhaps for workers who 
have been out of the labour market (e.g. for childrearing) or unemployed. If the employer is 
not satisfied with the employee’s performance, the contract will simply not be renewed. If the 
employer is pleased with the productivity of the employee, they will be hired on a permanent 
basis. By using such contracts it is today possible to increase the probation period from  the 
normal 6 months up to two years.  
 
 
2.2. Consequences for fixed-term employees – wages and transitions 
 
In the previous section we discussed firms’ reasons for using fixed-term contracts. In this 
section we consider the implications of fixed-term contracts for employees, introducing some 
theoretical perspectives on temporary employment to generate predictions for wage 
differentials and subsequent labour market transitions. According to one view temporary 
workers should receive higher wages to compensate for the loss of the expected value of 
redundancy pay and higher unemployment risk.  
 
While these compensating wage differentials will only be offered in competitive labour 
markets, a number of approaches see temporary employment as having substantially worse 
conditions of employment and poorer prospects than permanent employment (see e.g. Booth 
et al. 2002). What these approaches have in common is that they stress labour market 
boundaries, and the difference between temporary work and permanent work. Probably the 
most important of them is labour market segmentation theory (e.g. Doeringer and Piore, 
1971). According to the basis tenets of this theory, the labour market is divided into primary 
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and secondary segments. Primary segment jobs offer long-term, stable employment with 
structured career ladders. Jobs in the secondary segment offer lower wages, no training, few 
career prospects and unstable careers. The secondary segment is where temporary jobs will be 
found. Segments relying on unskilled labour will offer fixed-term contracts, not large 
engineering, professional and bureaucratic employers. Associated with these jobs will also be 
low wages and even possibly, due to recurring unemployment spells or less training 
opportunities and job prospects, lower wage growth.  
 
Two further reasons are usually reported why fixed-term employment may affect wages 
negatively: collective bargaining and wage discrimination (see e.g. Jimeno and Toharia 1993, 
Booth et al. 2002). As fixed-term workers will be made redundant first the probability of 
being employed increases for permanent workers with rising proportions of fixed-term 
employment. This will in turn increase their bargaining power, allowing them to negotiate 
higher wages. The second effect, wage discrimination arises when fixed-term workers are 
offered lower wages than comparable permanent workers. As collective agreements usually 
do not allow different wage rates for certain contract types, the discrimination will in effect be 
realized by sorting fixed-term employment into lower categories of employment.  
 
By contrast if employers use temporary contracts  as a screening device in order to extend the 
probation period, other outcomes for wages will be observed than discussed so far. From the 
screening approach we would expect wages to grow at least as fast as those on permanent 
contracts, as they move to a permanent job. Wang and Weiss (1998) even suggest that steep 
wage profiles might result as firms offer high wage increases to those workers they want to 
retain.  
 
From a reading of the literature two different central hypothesis evolve regarding transitions 
following temporary employment. From the segmentation literature is the idea that temporary 
jobs are found in segments of the labour market where unskilled work dominates and large 
amounts of these jobs are traps in so far as they will not lead to permanent employment. In 
fact in many cases temporary employment will be interspersed (by definition) with periods of 
unemployment, which has the well-known negative consequences for subsequent labour 
market performance. From the screening theory comes the idea that fixed-term jobs can be 
part of the matching process in the labour market. Thus many, though not all, temporary jobs 
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will lead to a permanent appointment. This perspective also implies that many of these 
permanent jobs will be in the same company.  
 
Finally, combining these two perspectives, a third possibility is that some temporary jobs are 
low-skilled and others are used for screening purposes. Screening periods more likely for 
positions crucial to the organisation: jobs with no qualification requirements attached are 
likely to be of little importance to the functioning of the firm. These latter jobs are simply 
used to regulate fluctuations in demand. Thus a temporary job is more likely to lead to 
permanent job if qualifications required are higher. The following empirical analysis will 
show whether there is any evidence for one of these first two hypotheses or whether there is 
indeed a two-tier labour market for fixed-term contracts with some workers being trapped 
while others use temporary employment as a bridge.  
 
3. Data 
 
We use the German Socio-economic Panel for our analyses (see SOEP Group  2001). The 
German Socio-economic Panel is a nationally representative panel survey which has collected 
data since 1984 for West Germany and since 1990 for East Germany. The question on 
whether the contract is temporary is not available for all waves of the panel study. In the early 
years we have complete information for all respondents in 1985 and 1988 only. Apart from 
those two years, only those who report job changes were asked about the type of contract. 
From 1995 onwards we have full information for both East and West Germany. This allows 
us to compare short run outcomes in the second half of the 1990s with longer run outcomes of 
up to 15 years1.    
 
Only samples A and C are included in our study, that means the original West German sample 
and the original East German sample; foreigners and migrants are excluded.2 For the results 
presented we have followed these sample distinctions in the survey. An alternative distinction 
is using the current region of residence.  We also tested some of the models, distinguishing 
                                                 
1 We cannot identify agency workers at any point in this survey. Agency workers may or may not classify 
themselves as on a temporary contract. While agency work has risen steadily in Germany in the last decade, and 
was 1.2% of dependent employment in June 2000, we do not expect it to affect our results (Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit, 2000).    
2 The foreigners and immigrants samples are not included as we believe that both the remuneration of 
employment and labour market transitions are sufficiently different in these two groups that they would need to 
be analysed separately. For the sake of clarity we focus on the West German and East German sample, where 
roughly 99% of respondents have German citizenship.    
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whether the individuals lived in East or West Germany at the time of the survey. Differences 
in findings are negligible. Apart from that the following selections were made. First of all, as 
is conventional in German analyses of temporary employment, we excluded the self-
employed and young workers in apprenticeship training schemes Moreover, we decided not to 
include civil servants, as their career patterns tend to be distinct from other workers. We 
limited the sample to those of working age, between 18 and 60 years of age. Finally, for the 
models,  we exclude observations with missing values on important variables: education, 
wages, type of contract, skill level, industry, firm size and region. Exact sample sizes are 
reported under the corresponding table.  A detailed list of independent variables used in the 
models, including their means and frequencies, is provided in appendix table B1. 
 
Using this data for 1999, for example, excluding apprentices, civil servants and those on 
ABM contracts, we find 8.2% of all employees aged 18-60 in temporary contracts: 8.5% of 
men, 7.9% of women3. Women are thus not substantially over-represented in temporary 
contracts, as in some other countries, for example the UK (OECD, 1993). In table 1 we 
compare temporary and permanent workers in Germany in 1999 - their age profile, working 
time and educational qualifications.  
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
Temporary workers tend to be younger than their permanent counterparts, as we might have 
expected. For men, a significantly greater proportion of temporary workers are found in part-
time employment than permanent workers. For women a large proportion of temporary 
workers work part-time, but this also holds for female permanent workers. There are some 
striking differences between temporary and permanent workers in terms of educational 
qualifications. For men we detect a slight “polarization” of qualifications among temporary 
workers, a greater proportion of them having either low qualifications (no vocational training) 
or third level education, compared to their permanent counterparts. For women, we find very 
many highly qualified temporary workers: over one third of female temporary workers have a 
third level qualification, compared to around 10% of permanent workers. For industrial sector, 
we find a much greater proportion of temporary workers in services, particularly the category 
“other services”, than is the case for permanent workers. These findings, i.e. that temporary 
workers are younger and less likely to have an apprenticeship training, are largely consistent 
                                                 
3 Weighted analysis of native East and West Germans. These proportions are somewhat higher than in the micro 
census as the samples are somewhat different. 
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with the findings of other more detailed analyses of the characteristics of temporary workers 
in Germany (Schömann and Kruppe, 1993, 1994; Giesecke and Gross, 2002). Having briefly 
sketched a profile of temporary workers, we now turn to the first part of our substantive 
analysis, comparing the wages of temporary and permanent employees. 
 
 
4. The cross sectional view: Do workers on fixed-term contracts earn less? 
 
We start by first looking at the typical cross sectional wage pattern, on which there is little  
evidence to date. Our analysis is most comparable to analysis from Booth et al. (2002) for the 
UK as well as Schömann and Kruppe (1993, 1994) and Schömann and Hilbert (1998) for 
Germany (also see Gross and Vogel 2001). All these papers look at the question of whether 
workers in fixed-term contracts earn less than comparable co-workers within standard wage 
regressions. Hagen (2001) also looks at the effect of fixed term contracts using different 
estimation procedures within a cross section of the GSOEP. His results are somewhat mixed 
as one estimator leads to relatively large wage differentials while the other shows hardly any 
differences. Schömann and Kruppe (1993, 1994) report that wages in West Germany tend to 
be significantly smaller, but not in East Germany. Our results will show that this could be due 
to the mixture of female and male workers within the same regression. Moreover, estimations 
for Germany so far have neglected the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in panel data. 
We control for this by comparing the outcome within conventional OLS models and fixed 
effects regressions. The OLS model is defined as follows: 
  
(1) titititi xfixedw ,,,1,ln εβγα +++=  
 
where wi,t is the hourly wage rate in period t of individual i (estimated from gross monthly 
wages and actual hours worked), fixedi,t indicates temporary contracts, xit includes the usual 
set of control variables (age, education, part-time worker status, spouse, skill levels, firm size, 
industry, region and the year of observation) and finally εi,t is the error term. In the case of 
fixed effects models we include individual constants αi that represent those effects peculiar to 
the ith individual which are more or less constant over time. Therefore, we excluded all 
individuals with less than 2 observations. In accordance with common practice we also 
excluded extreme hourly wage observations below 5 DM and above 100 DM.  
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Table 2a about here. 
 
As wage determination  can still be assumed to be different between east and west we 
estimate separate models for both parts of Germany. Men and women are also treated 
separately as it is well known that coefficients on important covariates might vary by gender.4 
Since we are primarily interested in the effects of contract type on wages we only report this 
coefficient in table 2. Full results for men can be found in appendix table B2. The estimated 
OLS coefficient (in specification I) of –0.163 for West German men and –0.106 for East 
German men are among what we could expect from previous research. This difference might 
be explained by the fact that wages on average as well as wage dispersion are lower in East 
Germany than in the West Germany. The same reasoning applies for women where we find 
negative differentials for workers on fixed-term contracts of –0.085 and –0.062, all of which 
are highly significant. The slight differences between East and West Germany could, 
however, be also due to a different structure of temporary jobs. As figure 1 shows nearly half 
of all temporary contracts in East Germany are within employment programmes 
(Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen ABM) while the number in West Germany is negligible.5 
When we estimated models distinguishing between both types of temporary contracts in East 
Germany we found that workers in employment programmes tend to have even lower wages 
than other East Germans on fixed-term contracts. However, apart from that, results do not 
differ and the results for those on employment programmes are therefore not reported 
separately in the tables.   
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
 
These results from specification I so far also correspond to findings from other countries like 
the UK and Spain. Booth et al. (2002) reports wage differentials very similar to ours for the 
UK. Jimeno and Toharia (1993) also estimate wage regressions to show that fixed-term 
workers earn roughly 10% less controlling for observable individual and job characteristics. 
Bentolila and Dolado (1994) show that wages of permanent workers have increased with the 
introduction of temporary contracts. Other researchers in Spain have used the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition to estimate wage discrepancies and have also found that fixed-term earn less, 
                                                 
4 As we are only interested in comparing temporary and permanent contracts for women who are actually in the 
labour market, we decided not to correct the female wage equation for selectivity. 
5 We thank Helmut Rudolph for kindly providing us with this graph.  
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though differentials are smaller for women and most of the differential can be explained by 
different characteristics (de la Rica and Felgueroso 1999, Davia and Hernanz 2001 and for an 
overview see Dolado et al. 2002). 
 
However, it is possible that these initial estimates are affected by unobserved differences 
between individuals. So, now we introduce individual fixed effects which are detected by the 
Hausman test to be superior to estimating random effects models. Looking at specification I, 
we first of all see that East and West German differentials converge roughly towards 0.06 for 
men and 0.03 for women. Obviously differentials between east and west but also between 
contracts types decrease. In the case of East German women contract type differences even 
disappear. Similar patterns have been reported by Booth et al. (2002) estimating fixed effects 
for the United Kingdom. This indicates that workers on fixed-term contracts are on average 
different from those on open-ended contracts. Such differences might, for example, be caused 
by diverse labour market experiences or ability: those workers who start off in worse jobs or 
more importantly have less unmeasured ability are found to experience a less successful 
career.  
 
Another way of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is to include measures of previous 
labour market experience. We do this by generating a variable "proportion of time 
unemployed in the previous 5 years" from the employment calendar of the GSOEP, which 
reports monthly labour force status. Results are presented in Table 2a, specification II. As can 
be seen from the table, previous unemployment experience reduces earnings significantly. 
Including our measure of heterogeneity also reduces OLS estimates while the FE results 
remain virtually unchanged. However, there is still a considerable decline in the estimates 
when moving from OLS to FE.  
 
So far we have compared fixed-term workers, who are supposed to have relatively short 
tenure within a firm, with all other workers with median tenure of roughly 9 years. If older 
workers are paid more, the fixed-term dummy might simply measure some kind of seniority 
effect. To test whether our fixed-term dummy measures real contract type effects or seniority 
effects we control for tenure in specification III by a set of dummy variables.6 Although fixed-
                                                 
6 The GSOEP supplies tenure information for West Germany for all waves and for East Germany starting in 
1997. We therefore had to calculate tenure for East Germany in 1995 and 1996 from the original variables. To 
check for the plausibility of our estimations we compared the original GSOEP tenure distribution in West 
Germany with the distribution from our estimations, and found them to be very similar.  
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term contracts are legally restricted to last only two years (except in academia), a non-
negligible proportion of our sample holds fixed-term contracts with the same firm for more 
than 2 years. Therefore we include two dummies for fixed term workers – one for those with 
tenure of less than two years and one for those with higher tenure. Workers with permanent 
contracts are sorted into four groups with tenure < 2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years and ≥ 10 
years. The reference category is chosen to be permanent workers with tenure ≥ 10 years. The 
results are also reported in table 2a. As can easily be seen by comparing the outcomes for 
workers with tenure less than 2 years, fixed-term contracts pay less than permanent contracts, 
with the exception of East German women, where OLS estimates show similar wage 
reductions. Again, the effects of contract type are reduced once we control for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity.  
 
Before turning to our dynamic analysis we need to consider another problem that has also 
been mentioned previously in the literature on this topic (see e.g. Hagen 2001). The fixed-
term dummy could be a choice variable, i.e. endogenous and therefore correlated with the 
unobservables that influence wages. Not controlling for this might bias our results. One 
possible way to test whether this is indeed a problem is to estimate a two-step instrumental 
variables model. In a first step we estimate a simple probit model where the dependent 
variable is one for workers with a fixed-term contract (see appendix table B3). The estimated 
probability is then included in a second step as an instrument in the wage regression. Table 2b 
reports the results for the simple specification I, where neither tenure nor unemployment 
experience is controlled for, and our most preferred specification III. Not controlling for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity in the instrumental variables estimator leads to estimated 
wage reductions well above the simple OLS estimates. This highly implausible result is also 
what Hagen (2001) reports in a cross sectional analysis estimating treatment models. 
However, we show that controlling for fixed-effects substantially affects this result and 
parameter estimates on the fixed-term contract dummy variable become insignificant. The 
same applies even if we control for tenure. This implies that the fixed-term contract dummy 
seems indeed to be correlated with the error term in the wage regression. Contract type and 
wages are determined simultaneously and the contract type can not without doubt be assumed 
to be an exogenous influence on wage rates.   
  
Table 2b about here. 
 
 13
Summarizing our results so far, we conclude that wage losses of fixed-term contract workers 
can be explained largely by individual heterogeneity and therefore the fact that different kind 
of workers are sorted into different jobs. The cross sectional evidence alone, however, can not 
be interpreted without doubt as conclusive evidence for the segmentation hypothesis. 
Therefore we would like to know whether workers earn significantly less over a longer time 
period or are caught in a long run trap of repeated low-wage contracts and unemployment 
experiences. As this has not been properly explored before, we go on in the following section 
to investigate the dynamic consequences of fixed-term employment on wages and transitions. 
 
 
5. The dynamic view 
 
To examine the competing hypotheses developed in section 2  we need to consider a group of 
temporary employees at one point in time, and then look at their wages and labour market 
status at some point in the future. Are the individuals subsequently found in permanent 
employment, still in a temporary job, unemployed or out of the labour market? What happens 
to their wages in comparison with other workers' wage growth?  
 
5.1. Wage growth and fixed term contracts 
 
We start off by estimating a simple 2-year wage growth regression that is specified similar to 
our wage level analysis using the same covariates:  
 
(2) tititititi xfixedww ,,,1,1, lnln εβγα +++=−+  
 
Results are presented in table 3. There are two important findings that can be reported from 
those growth regressions. First, looking at specification I we see that wages in West Germany 
tend to grow  more quickly for workers who have been on fixed-term contracts, while there 
are no differences in East Germany. Second, introducing fixed effects in this case actually 
increases the differences between contract types.7 The latter finding seems to indicate exactly 
the opposite of the level analysis. There is something different about those individuals on 
fixed-term contracts which makes their wages grow more quickly. However, this pattern does 
                                                 
7 The Hausman test is only significant for West Germany. However, random effect models yield the same results 
as OLS and are therefore not reported.  
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not hold for the whole sample of fixed-term contract workers: excluding the top 20% of wage 
growth observations, i.e. the highest quintile, leads to insignificant parameter estimates on the 
contract type which are thus not reported. Therefore, it seems that fixed-term workers are 
over-represented in the highest quintile, as 7.6% of all workers in that quintile are fixed-term, 
while only 5.4% are fixed-term in the whole sample. On the other hand this means that the 
rest of the fixed-term workers do not catch up, at least in the short-run. We also estimated 
some instrumental variables models and found once again, that the parameter estimates 
become insignificant once individual fixed effects are controlled for (not reported).  
 
Table 3 about here. 
 
To see whether there are some effects in the long-run we also estimated wage growth over the 
period 1995-1999 and 1985-1995. We included those workers observed in paid employment 
in those pairs of years, and do not yet control for the intervening time period. Obviously, there 
are severe selection problems here, however, we believe that it is still worthwhile looking at 
these estimates to find out something about longer-run wage growth. As the number of 
observations is already small, we only present OLS estimates in table 4. Here we find very 
strong growth effects indicating some sort of process whereby temporary workers catch up. 
Again, these results tend to become insignificant once the upper quintile is omitted. Only for 
male workers from western Germany do we find a marginally significant effect of 0.1 
remaining (not reported in the table). 
 
Table 4 about here. 
   
Our results so far show that a high percentage of fixed-term jobs seem to belong to a lower 
segment of the labour market. On the other hand there also seems to be a group of workers 
who do extremely well, even though they have been in a temporary contract at some point in 
their career. The consequences of fixed-term employment for wages are not unambiguously 
negative. 
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5.2. Transitions between fixed-term contracts, permanent jobs, unemployment, and non-
participation   
 
Up until now the dynamic analysis has focused on the wages of temporary employees, but by 
definition this is only for those who are subsequently in employment. In this section we focus 
on the subsequent labour market transitions of temporary workers, arguing that one cannot 
consider wage growth among temporary workers without doing so. What proportion of 
temporary workers remain in employment? Of these, how many get a permanent job, and how 
many remain in temporary employment? Which temporary workers make which transitions? 
The analysis thus allows us to look at empirical evidence for the debate on temporary 
employment as a “bridge” and a “trap”. We also compare the hypotheses derived from the 
segmentation and screening approaches described in section 2 above.  
 
Before assessing these transitions, we briefly consider previous evidence on labour market 
transitions. We turn first to German work on the topic, all of which uses the socio-economic 
panel. In an early paper Büchtemann and Quack (1989) find that fixed-term employment is 
associated with greater employment instability in West Germany, though they also stress that 
permanent employees with a job tenure of less than 2 years also have unstable employment 
careers. In a more recent paper Dekker (2001) looks at transitions between non-regular 
employment, regular employment and non-participation in the Netherlands, West Germany 
and Britain. For West Germany, Dekker (2001) concludes that "atypical" employment is “a 
phase workers are going through”. However, as he does not distinguish fixed-term work from 
other non-regular employment, we cannot be sure what role fixed-term contracts play here.  
 
Giesecke and Groß (2002) look at, amongst other things, the risk of, changing into a fixed-
term job in West Germany. They also examine the effect of fixed-term employment on the 
probability of becoming unemployed. While their results are interesting for this paper, their 
research design is somewhat different, so their results are not directly comparable to those 
presented below. They find that, compared to permanent employees, fixed-term employees 
are more likely to enter a second fixed-term job and also more likely to become unemployed. 
From this they conclude that those on fixed-term contracts are part of the secondary labour 
market, with relatively poor prospects. However, being in a fixed-term contract does compare 
favourably to being unemployed.  
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Focusing on whether temporary employment acts as a bridge from unemployment in the US, 
Farber (1999) shows that though job losers are more likely to be found in temporary jobs 
these will frequently lead back to regular full-time employment. For Sweden, using a sample 
of initially unemployed workers, Korpi and Levin (2001) show that permanent and temporary 
jobs differ relatively little in the employment security they offer the unemployed. 
 
For Britain Booth et al. (2002) consider transitions from temporary employment in Britain 
using a proportional hazard model. As they limit their focus to a group of workers on 
temporary contracts and follow their transitions, this analysis is closest to this paper, therefore 
we discuss their more detailed findings with the results below. Overall, they find some 
evidence to suggest that fixed-term contracts are a stepping stone to permanent work. By 
contrast Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), in her analysis of transitions of temporary workers in 
Spain, finds that temporary workers have little opportunity for advancement, and often remain 
trapped in a repeating cycle of temporary jobs.  
 
We begin our analysis of transitions from temporary employment in Germany by simply 
looking at what percentage of temporary workers move to different labour market states. In 
table 5 we show the labour market destinations of fixed-term workers one year later, for the 
years 1995-2000 for West and East Germany. Results are also presented for East Germany 
without those in employment programmes (ABM contracts).  
 
Table 5 about here. 
 
In table 5, panel A we see that for West Germany, on average two fifths of temporary 
employees have a permanent contract the following year. Of these, about 70% are with the 
same firm (see panel B). This supports the notion of temporary contracts as screening 
contracts or “bridges”, at least for a  substantial proportion of employees. About a further 35% 
of temporary employees have a temporary contract the following year, but note that once 
again, about 70% of these are with the same employer. Thus, it is more a case of longer 
temporary contracts, than moving from one temporary job to another. Splitting up the sample 
by age groups we see that older workers are more likely to get a permanent contract. If we 
compare destinations of temporary employees with those of permanent workers, we find 
temporary employees to be more at risk of both unemployment and leaving the labour market 
(see also Giesecke and Groß, 2002). Particularly the higher risk of unemployment fits the 
segmentation theory argument, though the finding is hardly surprising, given that these 
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contracts are by definition time limited. For East Germany the findings differ depending on 
whether we include those on an ABM contract or not. With the full sample we observe 
considerably more transitions to unemployment than in West Germany, around one third of 
all temporary employees, and less transitions to permanent employment. However, when we 
exclude those on an ABM contract, the transition pattern of temporary employees in East 
Germany looks rather similar to the West.  
 
In general the findings are in stark contrast to those reported by Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) for 
Spain, where only 11.6% of temporary employees in 1995 have a permanent job the next 
year, 62% a temporary job. With 40% of temporary employees each year in West Germany 
moving to permanent employment, we would argue these jobs cannot simply be labelled 
“traps”. 
 
We now go on to ask which temporary workers are making which transitions? Are the highly 
educated getting permanent jobs, those without qualifications becoming unemployed, as 
predicted by the third hypothesis in section 2.2? To analyse these transitions in more detail, 
we model these subsequent labour market states using a multinomial logistic regression. This 
model is an extension of the binary logistic regression model when multiple outcomes are 
mutually exclusive and independent of each other. The model estimates the log-odds of being 
in one labour market status versus another.  Thus:  
 
(3) Log [Prob (y=j)/Prob (y=J)] = α + βjiXi +uj 
 
where ‘J’ is the reference labour market state (in this case remaining in temporary 
employment) and ‘j’ any one of the others (i.e. permanent employment, unemployment and 
out of the labour market); α the constant, Xi  a vector of independent variables and βi the 
coefficient estimate for that independent variable for the contrast between labour market state 
‘j’ and the reference labour market state. We include a range of covariates measuring 
individual characteristics (age, education, disabled category, presence of small children) and 
job characteristics (such as firm size, working time, industrial sector) and finally two 
measures of employment growth.  
 
Focusing firstly on the labour market status one year later, the results of this model, using 
pooled data for 1995 to 2000, are presented in tables 6a and 6b for West and East Germany 
respectively. The coefficient estimates compare the log-odds of being in a state in year t+1, 
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compared to being in the reference category, conditional on having been in temporary 
employment in year t. Given that we use pooled data, the standard errors reported are using 
the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance8.  
 
Table 6 about here. 
 
As the results for East and West Germany are very similar, they are discussed together.  For 
the transition to permanent employment compared to staying in temporary employment, we 
find no significant gender difference. We do find that older employees are significantly more 
likely to move to permanent employment than the youngest age group, those under 30. The 
disabled are less likely to move to permanent employment. However, somewhat surprisingly, 
those with third level education are less likely to move to permanent employment than those 
with secondary education and no apprenticeship. This finding is similar to Dekker (2001) for 
all non-regular employment. Those in larger firms are also less likely to move to permanent 
employment. What is a likely explanation for this? One possibility is that these workers may 
simply have longer temporary contracts, so they are more likely to stay in temporary 
employment. In this case, we need to follow them over a longer time period, which is what we 
do in the long-run model presented later. 
 
What about the transition to unemployment and out of the labour market? For the transition to 
unemployment we find no significant gender differences, but East Germans on ABM are 
much more likely to become unemployed. Older workers are also more likely to become 
unemployed than younger workers. Those with third level education are somewhat less likely 
to become unemployed, though the effect is not significant.  Finally, those in a medium or 
large firm are more protected from unemployment than those in a small firm. For the 
transition out of the labour market we find, as expected, women are more likely to make this 
transition. The highly educated and those working in large firms are less likely to move out of 
the labour market. So too are older workers. Note that leaving the labour market in this case 
can be for a number of reasons - to look after children, but also to enter training and 
education. 
 
But what happens to these temporary workers after this year? Are their medium term 
transitions different from the short-term transitions? To check how sensitive our results are to 
                                                 
8 This estimation method is used for repeated observations, such as we have, allowing these observations not to 
be independent within clusters (Stata Manual, 2001). 
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the choice of yearly transitions, we estimated a long-run model looking at destinations 4 years 
later. However, because of the relatively small number of cases we found hardly any 
significant parameter estimates and the full results are not reported. The most important result 
is that the puzzling finding on higher education from the previous model has partly been 
resolved. For the medium term transition to permanent employment, having higher 
educational qualifications provides a distinct advantage. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that those with higher skills will be more likely to move to permanent employment, and also 
consistent with our interpretation of table 6, that those with higher education may have longer 
temporary contracts.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In the context of much discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of temporary work 
in Germany, our focus in this paper was on the implications of temporary employment for 
individual employees. Our overall conclusion is that temporary employment in Germany is 
not as disadvantageous as many people make out, but that temporary employees are a 
heterogeneous group, and we think it makes sense to speak of a “two-tier” market for 
temporary employment.  
 
Building on  previous research on wages of temporary workers which has found negative 
wage differentials for workers on fixed term contracts compared to permanent employees 
(Germany, Spain, France, UK),  we show that ignoring unobserved differences between 
individuals somewhat overestimated the wage differentials between permanent and temporary 
workers. However, wages of temporary workers are still lower on average, which seems to 
indicate some discrimination or segmentation of the labour market. Controlling for 
endogeneity of the contract type variable on the other hand, makes the wage differential 
become insignificant. This indicates that workers on fixed-term contracts tend to be those who 
earn lower wages. Looking at wage growth for 2-year, 5-year and 10-year intervals we further 
show clearly that on average West German male workers with fixed term contracts in the base 
year have higher wage growth. West German women experience higher wage growth at least 
in the short run and East German men in the long run.  However, splitting up the sample by 
quintiles we found that fixed-term contract workers are only over represented in the top 
quintile and higher wage growth is not at all an overall phenomenon of fixed-term contracts. 
This indicates that the screening hypothesis may just be relevant for some (better educated) 
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temporary workers. Results for East and West Germany are rather similar, though if anything 
overall differences between temporary workers and permanent workers are not as marked in 
East Germany, at least in terms of wages.  
 
The screening hypothesis is further supported by our transitions analysis: we find that about 
40% of all temporary workers are in a permanent job in the next year. Most of these 
permanent jobs are with the same employer. However, as 12-18% of temporary employees are 
unemployed the following year, temporary employment could also be seen as a risky labour 
market situation. Multivariate modelling reveals to whom these rather different scenarios 
apply: At least in the medium term, workers with more education tend to find permanent 
employment.  
 
Our findings indicate considerable heterogeneity of outcomes for temporary employees which 
supports the idea of a two-tier market for temporary employment in Germany. For highly 
skilled jobs temporary employment functions more as a screening contract, a probation 
period, after which the employee is offered a permanent job and experiences rapid wage 
growth. For other jobs, i.e. low-skilled jobs with low qualification requirements, employers 
use temporary workers to regulate fluctuations in demand.  For the individual employee in 
this kind of temporary job, a permanent job is not guaranteed afterwards, and temporary 
employment is an insecure labour market position. Workers falling into what is arguably the 
"middle tier" in Germany – those with apprenticeship training – are less likely to hold a fixed-
term contract. One could argue that the period of apprenticeship training already allows 
employers to screen workers reducing the need for fixed-term contracts. Indeed in further 
research it would be interesting to investigate in more depth how the consequences of fixed-
term employment are influenced by the existence of a widespread and highly developed 
system of apprenticeship training, such as it exists in Germany.  
 
The question of what proportion of temporary employees fall into each of the categories is 
more difficult to quantify. The wage growth estimates indicate rapid growth for a smaller 
group of temporary employees. However, the transitions analysis suggests that, at least in 
terms of the move to permanent employment, a significant proportion of temporary 
employees achieve permanence, even in the very short term (if we exclude ABM contracts, 
i.e. East German workers in employment programmes). On balance we conclude that our 
findings lend more credence to the screening/probation perspective, with temporary 
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employment providing a “bridge” for many into permanent employment. Certainly outcomes 
for temporary employees seem much more favourable in Germany than in Spain, where 
conclusions on temporary employment are much more pessimistic. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 - Who has a fixed term contract in Germany? 1999 
 
 Fixed-term in group i Permanent Fixed-term 
Groups 
 
(%) 
weighted 
(%) 
weighted 
N of cases (%) 
weighted
N of cases 
AGE      
   Men       
      under 30  18.3% 14.9% (344) 33.0% (77) 
      30-44 5.8% 51.8% (1099) 50.8% (68) 
      45 +  5.0% 33.3% (649) 16.2% (34) 
      
   Women      
      under 30  18.0% 17.7% (361) 35.5% (79) 
      30-44 6.5% 47.2% (883) 47.7% (61) 
      45 +  4.6% 35.1% (608) 16.8% (29) 
WORKING HOURS      
   Men       
      Full-time 6.7% 94.0% (2025) 80.2% (146) 
      Part-time             72.8% 6.0% (67) 19.8% (179) 
   Women       
      Full-time 40.1% 62.6 (1109) 54.8 (743) 
      Part-time  35.5% 37.4 (109) 45.2 (60) 
      
EDUCATION       
   Men      
     No train. 17.8% 10.0% (152) 22.6% (33) 
     Voc. train. 6.1% 73.6% (1586) 55.2% (103) 
     Third level 10.9% 15.1% (327) 21.4% (40) 
     Missing 10.0% 1.4% (27) 0.8% (3) 
      
   Women      
     No train. 12.0% 14.2% (220) 13.6% (30) 
     Voc. train. 6.2% 74.7% (1444) 49.5% (96) 
     Third level 19.7% 9.8% (163) 34.8% (40) 
     Missing 10.7% 1.3% (25) 2.1% (3) 
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Table 2a – Pooled Wage Level Regressions - Coefficient on Fixed-term-contracts 
 
 Men  Women 
 West East West East 
 OLS 
 
FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
Specification I         
Fixed-term -0.163*** -0.062*** -0.106*** -0.057*** -0.085*** -0.043*** -0.062*** -0.018 
 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Specification 
II 
        
Fixed-term -0.148*** -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.048*** -0.076*** -0.042*** -0.017 0.023 
    
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Proportion of   -0.291*** -0.113 -0.520*** -0.299*** -0.279*** -0.235*** -0.315*** -0.152***
time unemp. 
last 5 years 
(0.043) (0.070) (0.047) (0.076) (0.067) (0.104) (0.039) (0.055) 
Specification 
III 
        
Fixed < 2  -0.215*** -0.047*** -0.138*** -0.124*** -0.160*** -0.056** -0.132*** -0.022 
 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
Fixed ≥ 2 -0.196*** -0.069*** -0.092*** -0.006 -0.097*** -0.035 -0.078*** 0.020 
 
 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) 
Perm < 2 -0.109*** 0.002 -0.107*** -0.060*** -0.103*** -0.011 -0.137*** -0.036* 
 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) 
2 ≤ Perm < 5 -0.073*** 0.012 -0.077*** -0.037** -0.100*** -0.005 -0.118*** -0.035** 
 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
5 ≤ Perm < 10 -0.040*** 0.000 -0.019 -0.007 -0.027** 0.002 -0.070*** -0.028* 
 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Proportion of   -0.156*** -0.124* -0.387*** -0.201*** -0.101 -0.210** -0.183*** -0.136** 
time unemp. 
last 5 years 
(0.045) (0.071) (0.050) (0.078) (0.070) (0.106) (0.044) (0.059) 
Hausman testa 663.72*** 220.98*** 316.52*** 384.65*** 
No of cases 7294 4629 5801 4325 
 
Note:  OLS=Ordinary Least Squares regression, FE=Fixed effects regression.  
a: Random effects versus fixed effects regression. A significant result can be interpreted as evidence that the 
random effects v[i] and the regressors x[i,t] are correlated  (H0=difference in coefficients not systematic). Results 
reported for specification III. Significance levels: *** =   1%, ** =   5%, * = 10%.  
Source: Own calculations based on pooled waves 1995-2000 of the German Socio-Economic Panel samples A 
and C. Selection: without civil servants, without self-employment, without apprentices, only employees who are 
18-60 years old. Hourly wage observations below 5 DM and above 100 DM were dropped.  
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Table 3 – Pooled 2-Year Wage Growth Regressions - Coefficient on Fixed-term-
contracts 
 
 Men Women 
 West East West East 
 OLS 
 
FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
Specification I         
      Fixed-term 
 
  
0.036** 
(0.014) 
0.048** 
(0.023) 
-0.009 
(0.023) 
-0.028 
(0.035) 
0.055*** 
(0.020) 
0.067*** 
(0.032) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.027 
(0.033) 
Specification II         
   Fixed-term 
 
 
0.036** 
(0.014) 
0.047** 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
-0.029 
(0.035) 
0.056*** 
(0.020) 
0.068** 
(0.032) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.027 
(0.033) 
   Proportion of time  -0.003 0.019 0.086 0.095 0.013 -0.081 -0.019 0.003 
   unemp. last 5 years 
 
(0.048) (0.196) (0.060) (0.193) (0.078) (0.232) (0.044) (0.127) 
Specification II         
   Fixed < 2  0.039** 0.003 0.040 0.059 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.032 0.042 
 
 
(0.019) (0.032) (0.031) (0.054) (0.028) (0.047) (0.027) (0.049) 
   Fixed ≥ 2 0.034 0.042 -0.054 -0.052 0.033 0.076* -0.003 0.000 
 
 
(0.022) (0.034) (0.036) (0.056) (0.030) (0.046) (0.030) (0.052) 
   Perm < 2 0.002 -0.037* 0.025* 0.051 0.036*** 0.045** 0.016 0.058 
 
 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.015) (0.036) (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) (0.035) 
   2 ≤ Perm < 5 0.001 -0.038** 0.015 0.053 0.008 0.028** 0.010 0.061* 
 
 
(0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.034) (0.013) (0.026) (0.013) (0.031) 
   5 ≤ Perm < 10 -0.001 -0.012 0.005 0.036 0.028** 0.050* 0.011 0.058** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.033) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.028) 
Hausman testa 53.71** 34.32 69.02*** 41.41 
No of cases 5176 3149 3895 2966 
 
Notes: see Table 2 
 
 
Table 4  - Long Run OLS Wage Growth - Coefficient on Fixed-term-contracts 
 
 Men Women 
 West East West East  
 1985-95 
 
1995-99 1995-99 1985-95 1995-99 1995-99
Specification 1       
Fixed-term 0.265** 
(0.186) 
 
0.327***
(0.049) 
0.144***
(0.056) 
-0.111 
(0.099) 
0.072 
(0.054) 
-0.041 
(0.066) 
No. of cases 
 
609 897 567 374 642 531 
 
Note:Weighted Ordinary Least Squares regressions. Significance levels: *** =   1%, ** =   5%, * = 10%.  
Source: Own calculations based on waves 1985, 1995 and 1999 of the German Socio-Economic Panel samples 
A and C. Selection: without civil servants, without self-employment, without apprentices, only employees who 
are 18-60 years old. Hourly wage observations below 5 DM and above 100 DM were dropped.  
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Table 5 - Destinations of Temporary Workers one year later 
 
 
Panel A: Destinations 
 
 Perm  Temp Unemp Out N of cases 
 % % % % (unweighted) 
WEST 
 
41.0 36.3 11.8 10.9 810 
   < 30 
 
35.1 37.8 9.8 17.3 353 
   ≥ 30 
 
44.4 35.4 13.0 7.2 457 
EAST (with ABM#) 
 
29.2 34.6 30.5 5.8 850 
   < 30 
 
29.9 39.6 18.7 11.8 239 
   ≥ 30 
 
28.9 32.7 34.8 3.5 611 
EAST (no   ABM) 
 
40.0 36.0 18.4 5.7 580 
   < 30 
 
32.6 41.6 13.3 12.5 205 
   ≥ 30 
 
44.1 32.9 21.2 1.8 375 
 
Panel B: Firm switches 
 
 Destination: permanent contract 
 
Destination: temporary contract 
 without firm 
change  
with firm 
change 
without firm 
change 
with firm 
change 
 % 
 
% % % 
WEST 
 
70.8 29.2 68.4 31.6 
EAST (with ABM) 
 
65.8 34.2 66.8 33.2 
EAST (without   
ABM) 
64.6 35.4 74.5 25.5 
 
Notes: Weighted with longitudinal weight. # ABM status imputed for 1996 as it is not reported in the survey. 
Source:Own calculations from the GSOEP 1995-2000.  
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Table 6a Transitions from Temporary Employment. Log odds of being in a state in the 
next year, 1995-2000. West Germany  
 Permanent 
Employment 
Unemployment Out of Labour 
Market. 
Women 
 0.005 
(p. =0.981) 
-0.068 
(0.849) 
0.777*** 
(0.007) 
Ref:  Age: 18-30    
    Age: 30-44 0.369* 
(0.084) 
-0.089 
(0.817) 
-0.777*** 
(0.007) 
    Age: 45-60 0.875*** 
(0.007) 
0.032 
(0.954) 
-0.990** 
(0.043) 
Ref: no vocational     
   Secondary with vocational -0.101 
(0.710) 
-0.263 
(0.538) 
-1.389*** 
(0.000) 
   Third Level -0.650** 
(0.034) 
-0.888 
(0.126) 
-1.175*** 
(0.003) 
Previous Unemp. Experience 0.012 
(0.989) 
2.941** 
(0.011) 
0.811 
(0.524) 
Tenure (years) 0.042* 
(0.053) 
-0.032 
(0.590) 
0.026 
(0.427) 
Part-time/marginal -0.250 
(0.216) 
-0.192 
(0.617) 
0.569** 
(0.040) 
Disabled -0.963* 
(0.053) 
-0.275 
(0.681) 
-0.393 
(0.626) 
Ref:  Small firm    
   Medium firm -0.598** 
(0.028) 
-1.199*** 
(0.007) 
-0.385 
(0.306) 
   Large Firm -0.638** 
(0.011) 
-1.126*** 
(0.005) 
-0.782** 
(0.018) 
Emp. Change (year t) 0.209 
(0.246) 
-0.337 
(0.320) 
-0.314 
(0.237) 
Emp. Change (year t+1) 0.097 
(0.588) 
0.072 
(0.800) 
0.136 
(0.622) 
Notes: Results from a multinomial logistic regression with pooled data (unweighted). Reference category is 
temporary employment. No. of observations, 778; Log Likelihood –792.36 *P<=0.10; **P<=0.05; ***P<=0.01; 
Dummy variables for industrial sector, having young children and year of transitions are included but not 
reported. Selection: without civil servants, without self-employment, without apprentices, only employees who 
are 18-60 years old. 
Source: Own calculations from the GSOEP, 1995-2000.  
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Table 6b Transitions from Temporary Employment. Log odds of being in a state in the 
next year, 1995-2000. East Germany 
 Permanent 
Employment 
Unemployment Out of Labour 
Market. 
Women 
 -0.389* 
(p. =0.088) 
-0.123 
(0.597) 
-0.045 
(0.908) 
Ref:   Age: 18-30    
    Age: 30-44 0.170 
(0.482) 
0.424 
(0.134) 
-1.151*** 
(0.001) 
    Age: 45-60 -0.335 
(0.251) 
0.381 
(0.211) 
-1.833*** 
(0.000) 
Ref: no vocational     
   Secondary with vocational 0.332 
(0.386) 
-0.142 
(0.692) 
-1.056** 
(0.024) 
   Third Level 0.045 
(0.916) 
-0.788 
(0.061) 
-1.667*** 
(0.001) 
Previous Unemp. Experience 0.365 
(0.617) 
2.488*** 
(0.000) 
0.562 
(0.626) 
Tenure (years) 0.079*** 
(0.000) 
0.044 
(0.122) 
0.087** 
(0.023) 
ABM# -1.279*** 
(0.000) 
0.672*** 
(0.004) 
0.896** 
(0.036) 
Part-time/marginal -0.321 
(0.216) 
-0.137 
(0.613) 
0.755** 
(0.034) 
Disabled -1.245 
(0.154) 
-0.134 
(0.852) 
-0.502 
(0.715) 
Ref: Small firm    
   Medium firm -0.567** 
(0.039) 
-0.521** 
(0.003) 
-0.419 
(0.302) 
   Large Firm -0.594** 
(0.026) 
-1.009*** 
(0.000) 
-1.306*** 
(0.003) 
Emp. Change (year t) -0.062 
(0.623) 
-0.083 
(0.560) 
0.366 
(0.102) 
Emp. Change (year t+1) 0.080 
(0.501) 
-0.025 
(0.853) 
-0.054 
(0.821) 
Notes: See table 6. No. of observations, 840; #ABM imputed for 1996. Significance levels: *P<=0.10; 
**P<=0.05; ***P<=0.01. 
Source: Own calculations from the GSOEP, 1995-2000.  
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Appendix A 
 
The Employment Promotion Act (1985):  Introduction, Extensions and Amendments. 
 
• Employment protection which was introduced mainly in the early 1970s is relatively 
high in Germany.  For individual redundancies from permanent jobs works councils (if 
existant) have to be consulted and notice periods have to be given based on measures 
like tenure, age and type of job. Severance payments for individual redundancies are 
relatively frequent.  
 
• Pre-1985 – fixed term contracts only permitted for special reasons. Fixed-term 
contracts were limited to 6 months, and the employer had to demonstrate that the work 
was temporary by nature. 
 
• The  “Employment Promotion Act” (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) of 1985, 
removes the need for a reason under certain conditions. New employment contracts, or 
employment contracts immediately following vocational training are now permitted 
for a duration of up to 18 months.  In small, new firms, the contract can be for 24 
months. Valid until December 1989. 
 
• 1990, 1994 Extensions of  the Employment Promotion Act, finally until December 
2000. 
 
• 1996 – Extension of the maximum duration of fixed term contract to 24 months for 
new contracts; 3 continuous extensions within the maximum period allowed; 
unlimited temporary contracts for employees over 60. 
 
• 2001 – The new law on part-time employment and fixed-term contracts, extends the 
previous legislation on fixed-term contracts for an unlimited period. 
 
Source: Schömann and Hillbert (1998), Rudolph (2000), Bundesarbeitsblatt Februar (2001) 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 – Means and Frequencies in the Wage Level Analysis 
 
 Men  Women  
 N of cases Means/Frequencies N of cases Means/Frequencies 
West Germany     
ln (hourly wage) 7296 3.31 5801 3.02 
Fixed-term 378 5.18 349 6.02 
Part-time 230 3.15 2549 43.96 
Age < 30 1292 17.71 1253 21.60 
Age 30-44 3775 51.74 2732 47.10 
Age ge 45 2229 30.55 1816 31.30 
Spouse 5577 76.44 4341 74.83 
Hauptschule/no training 459 6.29 593 10.22 
Realschule/Abi/no training 235 3.22 325 5.6 
Hauptschule/training 3304 45.29 1954 33.68 
Realschule/Abi/train 2004 24.47 2240 42.06 
University 1294 17.74 489 8.43 
Unskilled blue collar 921 12.62 825 14.22 
Skilled blue collar 2258 30.95 238 4.10 
Unskilled white collar  130 1.78 453 7.81 
Skilled white collar 2021 27.70 3727 64.25 
Highly skilled white collar 1938 26.56 540 9.31 
Small firm (< 20) 1328 18.20 1680 28.96 
Medium (20-199) 2000 27.41 1598 27.55 
Large firm (>=200)  3968 54.39 2523 43.49 
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Table B1- continued Men  Women  
 N of cases Means/Frequencies N of cases Means/Frequencies 
East Germany     
ln (hourly wage) 4629 2.88 4325 2.83 
Fixed-term 306 6.61 381 8.81 
Part-time 64 1.38 1021 23.61 
Age < 30 782 16.89 779 18.01 
Age 30-44 2260 48.82 2077 48.02 
Age ge 45 1587 34.28 1469 33.97 
Spouse 3838 82.91 3599 83.21 
Hauptschule/no training 35 0.76 71 1.64 
Realschule/Abi/no training 95 2.05 56 1.29 
Hauptschule/training 855 18.47 574 13.27 
Realschule/Abi/train 2582 55.78 1970 45.55 
University 1062 22.94 1654 38.24 
Unskilled blue collar 632 13.65 419 9.69 
Skilled blue collar 2293 49.54 504 11.65 
Unskilled white collar  85 1.84 254 5.87 
Skilled white collar 778 16.81 2520 58.27 
Highly skilled white collar 837 18.08 618 14.29 
Small firm (< 20) 1286 27.78 1217 28.14 
Medium firm (20-199) 1841 39.77 1331 30.77 
Large firm (>=200)  1502 32.45 1777 41.09 
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Table B2 - Pooled Wage Level Regression Results for Men  
 
 West East 
 OLS 
 
FE OLS FE 
Constant 2.902*** 3.167*** 2.774*** 2.839*** 
 (0.020) (0.050) (0.052) (0.186) 
Fixed < 2  -0.215*** -0.047*** -0.138*** -0.124*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) 
Fixed ≥ 2 -0.196*** -0.069*** -0.092*** -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) 
Perm < 2 -0.109*** 0.002 -0.107*** -0.060*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) 
2 ≤ Perm < 5 -0.073*** 0.012 -0.077*** -0.037** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) 
5 ≤ Perm < 10 -0.040*** 0.000 -0.019 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) 
Proportion of time  -0.156*** -0.124* -0.387*** -0.201*** 
unemployed last 5 years (0.045) (0.071) (0.050) (0.078) 
Part-time -0.137*** -0.102*** -0.076** 0.094** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.045) 
Age 30-44 0.135*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.042** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) 
Age ge 45 0.180*** 0.029* 0.042*** 0.049* 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.027) 
Spouse 0.070*** 0.018* 0.017 -0.028 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) 
Realschule/Abi/no training 0.019* -0.052 -0.090 -0.055 
 (0.021) (0.046) (0.056) (0.201) 
Hauptschule/training 0.037*** -0.020 -0.131*** 0.068 
 (0.013) (0.033) (0.049) (0.163) 
Realschule/Abi/train 0.088*** 0.111** -0.087* 0.028 
 (0.014) (0.045) (0.049) (0.190) 
University 0.242*** 0.128*** 0.010 0.034 
 (0.017) (0.049) (0.051) (0.195) 
Skilled blue collar 0.101*** 0.027** 0.060*** -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Unskilled white collar  0.040* 0.010 0.007 -0.050 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) 
Skilled white collar 0.184*** 0.061*** 0.125*** 0.049** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) 
Highly skilled white collar 0.364*** 0.122*** 0.296*** 0.043 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.029) 
Small firm (< 20) -0.088*** -0.040*** -0.129 -0.077*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
Large firm (>=200)  0.083*** 0.024*** 0.101*** 0.058*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) 
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Appendix table B2 West East 
continued OLS 
 
FE OLS FE 
Linear yearly trend 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries -0.114*** -0.040 -0.221*** -0.071* 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.024) (0.037) 
Energy, water, mining 0.023* -0.012 0.065*** -0.094** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) (0.040) 
Construction 0.003* -0.010 0.041*** -0.030* 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) 
Trade -0.162*** -0.014 -0.095*** -0.028 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022) 
Transport, communication -0.123*** -0.021 -0.044*** -0.039 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.027) 
Credit and insurance -0.057*** 0.005 0.027 -0.138* 
 (0.014) (0.027) (0.035) (0.075) 
Other services -0.142*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.034 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) 
State and social security -0.070*** -0.013 -0.004 -0.053* 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.030) 
Private households -0.085*** -0.036 -0.031 -0.098** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.038) (0.040) 
F-test industries   
 
46.22*** 1.25 19.67*** 1.73* 
F-test regions 
 
3.88*** 2.56*** 74.29*** 5.38*** 
R2  (FE: overall) 0.53 0.23 0.42 0.18 
N of cases 7294 4629 
N of groups 1637 1061 
Note: OLS=Ordinary Least Squares regression, FE=Fixed effects regression. Control group: unskilled blue collar 
worker in manufacturing, under 30, without school or training, working full-time in permanent contract, in 
medium sized firm. Significance levels: *** =   1%, ** =   5%, * = 10%.  
Source: Own calculations based on pooled waves 1995-2000 of the German Socio-Economic Panel samples A 
and C. Selection: without civil servants, without self-employment, without apprentices, only employees who are 
18-60 years old. Hourly wage observations below 5 DM and above 100 DM were dropped.  
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Table B3 – Probit of being in a fixed-term contract (Used in IV-estimations)  
 
Covariates 
 
Coefficient Covariates 
 
Coefficient 
Constant -0.242 Skilled white collar -0.736*** 
 
 
(0.295)  
 
(0.161) 
Training last year 0.838*** Highly skilled white collar -0.853*** 
 
 
(0.268)  
 
(0.199) 
Out of labour force last year 0.218 Small firm (< 20) -0.228 
 
 
(0.213)  
 
(0.143) 
Unemployed last year 0.687*** Large firm (>=200)  0.235** 
 
 
(0.200)  
 
(0.116) 
Proportion of time employed in -2,565*** Agriculture, forestry,  -0.629 
the last 5 years 
 
(0.321) fisheries 
 
(0.588) 
Children -0.460*** Energy, water, mining -0.612 
 
 
(0.147)  
 
(0.502) 
Part-time 0.838*** Construction -0.082 
 
 
(0.200)  
 
(0.210) 
Age 30-44 0.068 Trade 0.265 
 
 
(0.154)  
 
(0.170) 
Age ge 45 -0.087 Transport, communication 0.284 
 
 
(0.187)  
 
(0.224) 
Spouse 0.082 Credit and insurance -0.406 
 
 
(0.134)  
 
(0.312) 
Practical training -0.109 Other services 0.644***
 
 
(0.180)  
 
(0.183) 
University 0.548** State and social security 0.567** 
 
 
(0.227)  
 
(0.243) 
Skilled blue collar -0.664*** Private households 0.512 
 
 
(0.151)  
 
(0.359) 
Unskilled white collar  -0.430*   
 (0.246)   
Note: Dependent variable = 1 if respondent has a fixed-term contract. Only those in employment are included. 
Control group: unskilled blue collar worker in manufacturing, under 30, without school or training, working full-
time in permanent contract, in medium sized firm. Significance levels: *** =   1%, ** =   5%, * = 10%.  
Source: Own calculations based on pooled waves 1995-2000 of the German Socio-Economic Panel samples A 
and C. Selection: without civil servants, without self-employment, without apprentices, only employees who are 
18-60 years old.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Temporary employment and employment programmes (ABM) 
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Source: Rudolph (2000) 
 
 
 
 
